The Global Enforcement of Human Rights: the Unintended Consequences of Transnational Litigation by Boggio, Andrea
Bryant University
DigitalCommons@Bryant University
History and Social Sciences Faculty Journal Articles History and Social Sciences Faculty Publicationsand Research
2005
The Global Enforcement of Human Rights: the
Unintended Consequences of Transnational
Litigation
Andrea Boggio
Bryant University, aboggio@bryant.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/histss_jou
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Law and
Society Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History and Social Sciences Faculty Publications and Research at
DigitalCommons@Bryant University. It has been accepted for inclusion in History and Social Sciences Faculty Journal Articles by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@Bryant University. For more information, please contact dcommons@bryant.edu.
Recommended Citation
Boggio, Andrea, "The Global Enforcement of Human Rights: the Unintended Consequences of
Transnational Litigation" (2005). History and Social Sciences Faculty Journal Articles. Paper 89.
https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/histss_jou/89
 1 
Int’l J. of Human Rights, 2005, Vol. 10 (4), pp. 000-00 
© 2005 Routledge 
 
 
THE GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSNATIONAL 
LITIGATION 
 
 
ANDREA BOGGIO* 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the last few years, a growing number of individuals whose basic rights are violated have filed 
transnational human rights claims in foreign countries. By placing the individual as a holder of 
basic rights at the core of the process of development, the capability approach, as put forward by 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, provides a fertile theoretical framework to assess 
translational human rights litigation. 
The paper shows that transnational claims are problematic in two regards: 1) They undermine 
development by discouraging foreign companies from investing in countries that are sources of 
transnational claims and by weakening local governments and judiciaries; 2) The conflict 
resolution process is inadequate because financial and practical constraints prevent stakeholders 
from directly participating in the process, and because assessing damages and enforcing award 
judgments will likely be unfair. The path to be taken involves developing a stronger rule of law, 
stronger local institutions and independent judiciaries in those developed countries where the 
violations of basic human rights take place. 
 
Key words: Capability approach – human rights violations – transnational litigation – 
multinationals – offshoring – Alien Tort Claims Act 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Violations of human rights raise both ethical and legal challenges. The capability 
approach  – as put forward by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum – persuasively 
advocates that human rights are an essential to development and that their violation is 
morally wrong and jeopardises the development process.  Primarily dealing with issues of 
quality of life, gender inequality, welfare economics, well-being and human 
development, the capability approach provides a conceptual framework to analyze 
transnational human rights litigation.1 Transnational human rights litigation is a dispute 
resolution process exercise of jurisdictional power of courts in Country A to solve claims 
brought by one or more citizens of Country B for violations of human rights that took 
                                                  
* This is a revised version of the paper presented at the conference From Sustainable  Development to 
Sustainable Freedom, 7–9 September 2003, University of Pavia, Italy. The author welcomes comments at 
boggio@stanfordalumni.org. 
 2 
place in Country B. Transnational claims thus aim to geographical fill the gap between 
the place where the human rights violation took place and the place where the legal 
claims are adjudicated.  However, whether this dispute resolution process is the best 
arrangement to solve those disputes and fill the geographical gap is a controversial policy 
issue.  
In this paper, I argue that, although a valuable tool to redress human rights 
violations, overtime transnational litigation may have a negative impact on the same 
individuals and societies that benefit from today’s transnational lawsuits. Among the 
unintended consequences, transnational litigation may in fact undermine the development 
of LDC by rendering those countries less competitive from a legal standpoint and by 
weakening local governments and judiciaries. I then show that capability approach 
provides a valuable ethical framework to reason about the policy issues arising out of 
transnational human right litigation. I then conclude that the capability approach suggests 
that favouring local adjudication through capacity building instruments is a superior 
dispute resolution process to transnational human right litigation. 
II. THE CAPABILITY APPROACH AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
The capability approach places the individual as a holder of basic rights at the 
core of the process of development.  Thus, rather than seeing the individual aspects of the 
civil and political human freedoms as opposed to the collective aspects of the social and 
economic human rights, the two are approached as an integrated and mutually 
interdependent whole. The basic idea is that ‘[d]evelopment can be seen . . . as a process 
of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy,’2 or, in Sen’s jargon, people’s 
capabilities. The capabilities are defined as ‘what people are actually able to do and to 
be,’3 or the opportunities to undertake actions and activities that the capabilities’ holders 
want to engage in and be whom they want to be. This broad approach emphasises the 
relevance of the whole array of human capabilities in development processes, which list 
comprises social, cultural and economic capabilities such as the right to health, the right 
to food and the right to livelihood. The capabilities are thus conceptually distinct from the 
‘achieved functionings,’ i.e. to transform the capabilities in actions and conditions of the 
real such as working, resting, being literate, being healthy, being part of a community, 
being respected. Under the capability approach what is ultimately important is that people 
have the freedom to choose what they want to do and be, and that social institutions 
should put them in the position to enjoy those freedoms or capabilities and to be free to 
choose individually which capabilities ought to be transformed in functionings.4 
The capability approach thus provides a fertile framework for policy analysis. 
Public policies, market mechanisms and social institutions are evaluated to be good and 
just insofar as they expand people’s capabilities consisting of their opportunities and 
choices to lead valuable human lives. In other words, social arrangements should ideally 
aim at expanding the people’s capabilities at the greatest extent possible. Policies should 
thus aim at putting the capabilities’ holders in the position of freely making choices. 
Limitations to their freedoms are suspect. Consequently, people should have right to their 
individual capabilities. 
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Scholars of the capability approach have discussed at length the relationship 
between the human capabilities and human rights.5 Although Sen and Nussbaum are in 
disagreement on whether certain basic capabilities are morally required, both 
philosophers agree that a certain degree of capabilities – a threshold degree – should be 
afforded to all human beings to put them in the condition of living a decent human life. In 
Sen’s language, such amount of capabilities is called ‘basic capability’ and ‘[it] is 
intended to separate out the ability to satisfy certain crucially important functionings up 
to certain minimally adequate levels.’6 On the other hand, Nussbaum argues that people 
are entitled to central human capabilities, which are formally enumerated in form of list,7 
which should serve as ‘a foundation for basic political principles that should underwrite 
constitutional guarantees.’8 Thus every society should strive to guarantee to its members 
a set of entitlements including capabilities such as living a long life and avoiding 
premature death, having good health and adequate nourishment, freedom of movement, 
freedom from assault, freedom of choice regarding sexual matters, to use one’s senses, 
imaginations thinking and practical reason, and to engage in various forms of social and 
political relationships.9  Although the differences between the major thinkers behind the 
capability approach are not trivial,10 for the purpose of this paper, both scholars advocate 
the legal recognition of basic human entitlements or capabilities, whose infringements 
would be considered a violation of a basic human right. 
III. THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ADJUDICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 
Everyday, many individuals are unfortunately denied their basic human rights. 
The Human Development Report 2000 notes that, ‘Of all human rights failures today, 
those in economic and social areas affect by far the larger number and are the most 
widespread across the world's nations and large numbers of people.’11 Classic Western 
legal theorists think that the legal systems should provide the environment where social 
and economic human rights grow as integral part of development by empowering the 
capabilities’ holders of a right to claim to legal redress for the violations of their basic 
human freedoms and rights.12 In other words, legal systems shall provide both remedies 
and a process to redress the violations of human rights. In fact, exercising the right to 
claim legal redress gives rise to a dispute resolution process that aims at filling the gap 
between the claim and the remedies available under the law. 
In the last few years, individuals of countries that do not afford these such basic 
human rights – in most cases less developed countries (LDCs) – have increasingly sought 
legal redress by filing transnational human rights claims. Because of a weak rule of law 
and the lack the domestic legal institutions that can provide reasonable redress to those 
claims, claimants seek justice in foreign jurisdictions where such preconditions exist. 
Thus, British judges have adjudicated claims brought by South-African asbestos miners 
because of their asbestos-related injuries and U.S. judges have adjudicated claims brought 
by groups of Burmese, Latin and Central American workers for the violations of their 
basic rights while working in their countries for U.S. and European companies. 
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Transnational litigation often provides the only avenue to provide legal redress – 
in the form of economic and non-economic compensation – to the victims of human 
rights violations in LDCs and to stop the violators from infringing upon individuals’ 
rights. The growing substitution of foreign labour for domestic labour, i.e., offshoring – 
especially in those countries were hourly wage are significantly lower that in Western 
societies – suggests that transnational litigation will be pursued more often. As on 
corporate consultants put it, ‘the economics of offshoring are just too compelling to 
ignore if does right.’13 McKinsey cites two examples to support the claim. ‘BMW’s plant 
in South Africa employs the same line of attack. Operating in these countries often 
requires extra training for workers—BMW spends three to five times more on training in 
South Africa than it does in its other plants—but wage differences more than offset that 
cost.’ Moreover, ‘a leading U.S. personal-computer manufacturer created telephone- and 
e-mail-based customer service centres in India to provide technical support. In addition to 
saving more than $100m annually, it has significantly increased the proportion of 
customer problems it resolves.’14 This prediction might be particularly accurate because 
countries offering lower hourly wages area often not on the forefront of acknowledging 
and enforcing human rights violations. In the next section, I discuss some of the 
transnational cases that have been already brought in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom. 
IV. TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 
Although numerous kinds of claims fall under the notion of transnational human 
rights litigation, I focus my analysis on human rights violations substantiating in personal 
injuries arising out of employment conditions.15 Foreign citizens have been able to bring 
personal injury actions against foreign companies before courts in the United States and 
in the United Kingdom for negligent actions an omissions committed in the country 
where the plaintiffs reside seeking compensation of the infringements of their basic 
rights. Tort laws and specific statutes both in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom provide the basis for filing transnational claims. U.S. federal courts may in fact 
hear ‘any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the Unites States.’16 Similarly, British common law allows 
foreigners to file their claims in British courts unless the defendant can show that the 
foreign forum is more suitable ‘for the interests of all the parties and the ends of 
justice.’17 Involving the combined application of national laws, foreign laws, and 
principles and rules of public international law, the adjudication is always carried out by 
foreign judicial systems and judges appointed by foreign governments who apply the 
procedural law of the location of the trial. The next two sections will discuss examples of 
transnational lawsuits brought in the two cited jurisdictions. 
A. THE UNITED STATES: LITIGATION UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 
(ATCA) 
The Alien Tort Claims Act allows foreign plaintiff to file tort claims in US 
Federal Courts. ‘The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
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an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
Unites States.’18 Thus, ATCA grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over foreign defendants in 
tort actions where plaintiffs assert a tort claim that violates a U.S. treaty or the ‘law of 
nations.’19 
Beginning with Filartiga,20 the long-dormant ATCA increasingly presented the 
prospect of enforcing international human rights violations through the U.S. federal 
courts. In Filartiga, a torture claim was brought against a former official of the 
government of Paraguay. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that an alien could sue 
in U.S. federal court for a ‘tort’ that violates the ‘law of nations.’21 The court found that 
torture violated the law of nations,22 and avoided the necessity of ruling on whether a 
private party could be liable since the defendant had been a state actor when the 
violations occurred.23 
Since Filartiga, courts ‘have also recognised that the statute applies to 
commanders as well as to the actual torturer, to organizations and corporations as well as 
to individuals, and to private personas well as to government actors.’ Thus taking 
advantage of the modern doctrine of ATCA that born out of atrocious human rights 
abuses, several foreign plaintiffs sought to redress human rights violations that had taken 
place in the workplace. The first of these new ATCA lawsuits was filed in September 
1996 by a group of Burmese against a U.S. company, Unocal.24 Plaintiffs alleged that 
Unocal was liable for international human rights violations perpetrated by the Burmese 
military by knowingly using forced labour to construct a natural gas pipeline across the 
Tenasserin region of Burma, which was created to natural gas from oil fields off the coast 
of Burma to the Thai border. Although plaintiffs’ claims had been initially dismissed on 
summary judgment by District Court, in September 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals rendered a landmark decision against Unocal, allowing plaintiffs to proceed to 
trial in federal court. 
While the allegations against Unocal for using slave labour in Burma are litigated, 
a series of cases have been brought under the ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection 
Act (TVPA)25 alleging that some of the largest American corporations have knowingly 
participated in human rights violations while operating business in foreign countries. The 
case law was in fact allowing claims against private corporations when it had engaged ‘in 
one of the core international law violations that do not require state action, such as 
genocide or slavery, or when it acts in complicity with a state actor committing any of the 
core violations.’26 Thus, Exxon Mobil was named defendant by a group of Indonesian 
citizens for allegedly committing violations of human rights by recruiting one or more 
military units to provide security for its gas extraction and liquefaction project.27 
Plaintiffs’ theory of liability is that Exxon is liable either because the defendant either 
employed members of the military units or based on the liability theories of respondeat 
superior or vicarious liability. Moreover, Coca-Cola was named defendant in a lawsuit 
filed by five Colombian nationals and a Colombian labour union for tortuous acts 
allegedly consisting in using paramilitaries to engage anti-union violence.28  Fresh Del 
Monte Produce was named defendant in a lawsuit filed by five former union leaders who 
were allegedly tortured and detained in Guatemala.29  Finally, DynCorp was named 
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defendant in a lawsuit filed by the International Labor Rights Fund on behalf of more 
than 10,000 Ecuadorian citizens who are ‘suffering health effects as a result of the 
company’s spraying of a toxic herbicide on their communities as part of a larger 
operation to eradicate coca plants in Columbia.’30 
All these cases allege blatant violations of human rights that raise important legal 
issues of whether U.S. courts have jurisdiction over all the claims, whether the defendants 
owed a duty of care to the foreign victims of human rights violations and, finally, whether 
the American corporate parent should be held liable for the actions of the foreign 
subsidiary. All these issues have been major procedural barriers to foreign plaintiffs: 
‘Most of the post-Filártiga cases have been dismissed, most often for failure to allege a 
violation of international recognised human rights, for forum non conveniens, or because 
of the immunity of the defendant.’31 
Courts are in the process of addressing them as they are presented in courts. 
Although predicting the future of ATCA litigation is difficult, both advocates for and 
against ATCA litigation32 share the common view that U.S. courts are increasingly 
favourable to transnational claims and that it is reasonable to assume that, in the next five 
years, ATCA cases will be increasingly filed and U.S. courts asked to adjudicate them. 
Given the sympathetic support of U.S. courts, it is also foreseeable that plaintiffs will 
overcome today’s procedural barriers, and that judges and juries will be eventually asked 
to define the scope of the actionable violations and the standard of liability. 
Today the scope of ACTA litigation has been certainly limited to certain major 
human rights violations.  Courts have held that ATCA provides a cause of action as 
‘plaintiffs . . . allege a violation of ‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ international 
norms as part of [their] ATCA claim.’33 Defining the substance of the ‘law of nations’ is 
a however complex tasks that U.S. courts still have to perfect. In Filartiga, the Second 
Circuit held that ‘[t]he law of nations ‘may be ascertained by consulting the works of 
jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; 
or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.’’34 The law of nations may be 
defined as, 
[A] system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by 
universal consent among the civilised inhabitants of the world . . . to 
insure the observance of justice and good faith, in that intercourse which 
must frequently occur between two or more independent states, and the 
individuals belonging to each.35 
Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit pointed out that deriving concrete standard of 
liability from ‘amorphous’ international law norms places ‘an awesome duty on federal 
courts.’36 If there is some agreement that torture, murder, slavery, rape and genocide are 
within the notion of ‘law of nations,’ international consensus is lacking on many issues 
crucial to human rights concerns such as a living wage, minimum health and safety 
standards, maximum hours, and sexual harassment.37 However, ‘[ATCA] presents the 
potential to address claims involving intentional physical or mental harm, but is not likely 
to reach less extreme but much more common claims, including abominable working 
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conditions.’38 In other words, the scope of the notion of ‘law of nations’ is evolving and 
expanding overtime, eventually providing a transnational tool to the redress of a wide 
range of human rights violations. 
When cases will reach a stage where courts or juries will be required to make a 
determination of liability, the central question will be to define under which standards of 
liability under which the defendants should be tried. It is very likely that the law of the 
forum – U.S. law in ATCA cases – will become the law to be applied to the facts of the 
case. Most of ATCA cases are, in fact, tort cases, thus requiring a determination of 
whether or not the defendant knowingly or negligently breached the duty of care owed to 
foreign victims of human rights violations. Although, under the majority rule, ‘ATCA not 
only confers jurisdiction but also creates a cause of action,’39 U.S. federal judges will be 
very likely to find those standards in domestic law, especially of the plaintiff’s legal 
system provide very limited protection to the victims. They will do either in bench trials 
or in instructing juries, or in deciding over an appeal as in the Unocal case. 
indeed, the published ATCA opinions support my claim that the process I 
describe is taking place. Thus, the Ninth Circuit defined ‘forced labour’ – which the 
judges considered to be a violation of the ‘law of nations’ – by making reference only to 
U.S. case law and to the U.S. Constitution, without even trying to capture a more 
widespread, supranational notion of ‘forced labour.’40 Furthermore, if juries will be asked 
to make a determination of liability, jurors will likely decide by using their natural 
mindset, the perspective of the average American juror. Furthermore, the actors of the 
litigation process are invariably lawyers and judges trained in domestic law, admitted in 
the domestic jurisdiction, and daily practicing domestic law. Thus, they will likely litigate 
the case as if they were ordinary civil actions. Finally, defendants’ actions will be found 
‘reasonable’ if complying with American standards.  In sum, if U.S. courts will ever deal 
with the substance of ATCA claims, in the absence of clear agreement of international 
lawyers and scholars, American corporation will likely to be held liable as if they were 
conduction business in the United States or any other developed country. 
B. THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE SOUTH-AFRICAN ASBESTOS LITIGATION (LUBBE V. 
CAPE)41 
English common law allows transnational human right claims. ‘Traditionally 
English courts did little to discourage litigants form choosing to litigate in England, when 
the case was brought there consistent with English jurisdictional rules.’42 In 1972, Lord 
Denning stated that, 
No one who comes to these courts asking for justice should come in vain. 
To rights to come here is not confined to Englishmen. It extends to any 
friendly foreigner.43 
Although this liberal view has partially eroded over the past two decades, foreign 
claimants are denied access to British courts only if the defendant can show that the 
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foreign forum is more suitable ‘for the interests of all the parties and the ends of 
justice.’44 Such limitation is known as the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
This jurisdictional barrier did not dissuade a group of asbestos victims from filing 
personal injury lawsuits in the English High Court. Thus, in February 1997, five miners 
from Prieska and Penge filed claims to recover damages in court for personal injuries 
caused by the exposure to asbestos fibres in the course of their employment. ‘The claims 
were based principally on the negligent control of the company’s world-wide asbestos 
business from England and failure to take measures to reduce asbestos exposures to a safe 
level.’45 The complaint alleged that the defendant as a parent company had failed to 
discharge its duty to ensure the compliance with proper health and safety standards by its 
overseas subsidiaries. 
The defendant, Cape Ltd., had directly owned some of its South African operation 
for many years.  By 1948, the company had restructured, so that its mining and 
manufacturing operations were owned by South African subsidiaries. In 1979, Cape sold 
its South African asbestos mining subsidiary, and, in 1989, its remaining interests in the 
manufacturing subsidiaries.46 
Two Court of Appeal and two House of Lords decisions were necessary to 
dismiss the defendant’s argument that British courts were a forum non conveniens, and to 
establish the right of South African miners to have their cases heard.47 On appeal before 
the House of Lords, the plaintiffs eventually succeeded in establishing the English courts’ 
jurisdiction over the claims. The House of Lord ruled unanimously that, although South 
African courts were clearly the more appropriate forum for the trial, substantial justice 
would not have been served if the claims were litigated in South Africa. Under the 
governing law, claims should be dismissed on forum non conveniens arguments if a two-
prong test is satisfied: (1) only the foreign forum is more appropriate, and (2) justice is 
likely to be served in the appropriate forum. The highest British court concluded that 
South African courts were not the most appropriate forum because there was no evidence 
that legal aid would have been available to the miners. Lord Bingham noted that, 
If these proceedings were stayed in favour of the more appropriate forum 
in South Africa the probability is that the plaintiffs would have no means 
of obtaining the professional representation and the expert evidence that 
would be essential if these claims were to be justly decided. This would 
amount to a denial of justice. 48 
Furthermore, there was evidence that suggested that, under the circumstances of 
the case, legal representation would be likely not available if the claims were to be 
litigated in South Africa. Second, South African law did not provide specifically for 
group actions, thus raising suspicions about the ability of South African claims to provide 
an adequate and fair setting for the trial.49 
Although plaintiffs successfully established their right to have their claims heard 
by U.K. judges, the over 7,500 claims were never litigated, nor in England neither in 
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South Africa. The parties eventually settled the case in December 2001 after long 
negotiation.50 Under the settlement agreement, 
[The defendant] has agreed to pay a total of £21 million into a Trust fund 
to be established in South Africa which will make payments to those who 
may show that they have suffered from asbestos-related disease . . . as a 
result of working at, or living in the vicinity of, one of Cape’s former 
mining, milling, or manufacturing operations in South Africa.51 
Under the agreement, compensation is available not only to the claimants who 
took part in the English litigation, but also to all victims who satisfy the conditions set by 
the trust. The level of compensation is linked to the severity of the disease: 
‘[M]esothelioma awards being the highest (about £5,250 total maximum); asbestosis 
(about £3,250 total max); pleural thickening/pleural effusion (about £1,600 total max), 
pleural plaques (about £700 total max).’52 
Although the litigation and the negotiation were successful, enforcing the 
settlement has proven to be a complex task. Under the agreement, the £21m will not be 
paid in one lump sum, but the defendant was supposed to make available the first £11m 
in June 2002 only if various conditions are satisfied, the most important being the South 
African Government’s commitment of not funding future legal claims against Cape and 
of not pursuing Cape ‘for any cost of rehabilitating its former asbestos mines.’53 Under 
threat of bankruptcy, Cape failed to pay the settlement for several months. However, in 
June 2003, the High Court eventually approved the compensation settlement at the end of 
the hearing. Cape handed over bankers’ drafts for £7.5m, which victims to receive 
payments during summer 2003.54 
V. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LITIGATION  
In the remains of the paper, I shall investigate under the lenses of the capability 
approach the policy question of whether transnational litigation is better suited to redress 
human rights violations. The central idea of the capability approach is that 
‘[d]evelopment can be seen . . . as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people 
enjoy.’55 In other words, there is no development without freedom. My analysis will be 
thus proceeds from the point of view of the capabilities’ holders who are entitled to basic 
freedoms that human rights violations infringe. Those individuals are nonetheless the 
citizens of those LCDs where the violations took place. Transnational human rights cases 
are litigated in their interest – they are the stakeholders with the greatest interest in 
dispute resolution process – and the expansion of their freedoms creates development for 
them and their countries. Thus, the capability approach places the holders of basic 
freedoms and rights at the centre of the policy analysis, and consequently of my analysis 
of human rights transnational litigation as dispute resolution process. 
From the point of view of capabilities’ holders, this litigation has the undeniable 
merit of providing judicial redress to violations that, without the involvement of foreign 
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judicial systems, would be unheard in courts. In fact, the victims would not have access 
to justice in their home countries, and would receive no compensation. Moreover, the 
perpetrators of the violations would not be held accountable. In today’s ineffectiveness of 
many judicial systems around the world, stopping transnational claims would impair the 
ability of the capabilities’ holders to seek legal redress and of many countries to move 
toward development. However, the policy analysis of transnational claims should take 
into account a long-term perspective. The inquiry should thus focus on whether 
transnational litigation is the dispute resolution process that better protects the interests of 
the holders in the long run. 
The next section will thus critically assess, from a policy perspective, the ability 
of transnational human rights litigation to serve the interests of the holders. I will argue 
that transnational human rights litigation affects development in at least in two regards. 
First, it discourages foreign companies from investing in countries that are sources of 
transnational claims. Second, it weakens local governments and judiciary. Each argument 
will be examined separately. 
A. TRANSNATIONAL CLAIMS UNDERMINE DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE COUNTRIES 
THAT ARE SOURCES OF TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION ARE LESS COMPETITIVE 
In a long term perspective, transnational human rights litigation may have a 
negative impact on development: Countries that are sources of transnational litigation 
may become, overtime, less competitive than countries that afford domestic, legal redress 
to human rights violations.56 
As many commentators suggest, this litigation is moving its early steps very often 
with insurmountable difficulties. However, it is likely that courts will be increasingly 
asked to adjudicate those kinds of claims in the next few years. As I argued earlier in the 
paper, overtime Western courts will likely hold Western companies accountable for their 
actions and omission in LDCs under the legal standards that they apply in domestic cases. 
In other words, Western corporations will be held accountable to identical standards 
whether investing in developed countries or in LDCs that are sources of transnational 
claims. For instance, if the South African case had been tried rather than settled, the 
English judges would have been asked to decide whether or not Cape was negligent in 
exposing South African miners to an unreasonable risk. The lawyers would have 
probably borrowed information – medical link between asbestos and several diseases, 
knowledge of asbestos toxicity, availability of safer technologies – largely from the 
earlier asbestos litigation in U.K. courts. Moreover, although contextualizing the 
information gathered along the litigation process to South Africa, the U.K. judges would 
have likely held the defendants liable for damages based on U.K. tort law rather than 
South African negligence principles. 
This suggestion logically leads to investigate its implications on the LDCs 
involved. In my analysis, I assume that courts in a LDC, Country Z, ordinarily hear cases 
that qualify as human rights violations, while courts in Country A do not afford similar 
legal protection. Country Z is thus not a source of transnational litigation; Country A is. 
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Country Z would thus have a legal and judicial system capable of holding domestic and 
foreign violators of human rights accountable for their misconducts. Because both the 
rule of law and a politically-independent judiciary are in place, Country Z’s system works 
and its policymakers are in the position of being able to draft less rigorous standards than 
Western democracies, in a fashion that will attract foreign investors without 
compromising basic individual freedoms.57 These countries could thus make use of their 
legal systems as tools to attract foreign investors by adopting and implementing liability 
standards more liberal than countries with similar level of development yet unable to 
provide internal legal redress. In the other hand, LDCs that are sources of transnational 
human rights litigation in the past or where the lack of rule of law and of an independent 
judiciary strongly suggest that, in case of human rights violations, lawsuits will be filed in 
the country where the parent company has its headquarters, are not in the position to 
attract foreign investors, who will be likely to be held accountable in their home courts 
based on more rigorous standards. Overtime, the latter countries would attract fewer 
investments, thus undermining their economic development. In sum, countries with a 
weaker rule of law and institutions and high risk of generating transnational lawsuits will 
attract less investments that countries where a greater level of domestic redress is 
afforded to citizens whose human rights have been violated. Western investors will in 
fact be likely attracted to LDCs with lower – yet respectful of basic human rights – 
standards of liability for workplace misconducts. 
B. TRANSNATIONAL CLAIMS UNDERMINE DEVELOPMENT BY WEAKENING 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND JUDICIARIES 
Transnational human rights litigation may weaken local institutions of the LDCs 
whose citizen bring the claims in foreign courts. It may in fact reduce their ability to 
regulate domestic matters and to negotiate matters of foreign policy with the governments 
of the countries where the litigation takes place. 
In transnational litigation, a foreign judge determines whether or not a violation of 
a human right took place in the country where the negligent actions and omissions 
occurred. To conclude that a violation took place, the foreign judge shall determine what 
the defendants should have done to avoid violating a human right. Thus transnational 
litigation turns into ‘an exercise in extraterritorial jurisdiction: courts in one jurisdiction 
sit in judgment on the propriety and legality of behaviour in another jurisdiction.’58 
The foreign judge may do so by making reference to various sources, namely the 
‘laws of nations,’ to the legal standards of either countries involved, or to international 
law and agreements. However, whichever legal basis the court adopts, the political 
significance of its action does not change. Foreign judge are in essence making a 
normative assessment of the other legal system. In their opinions, foreign judges are thus 
stating what the law of the country where the violation took place should be. The 
institutions of LDCs that are sources of transnational litigation are consequently limited 
in their ability to regulate internal matters. 
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Transnational litigation has also a second negative impact on the institutions of 
LDCs that are sources of those claims. It weakens the role of LDC governments in 
shaping foreign policy. The argument has been made from United States’ perspective, by 
saying that ATCA litigation undermines U.S. foreign policy. A commentator argued that, 
The use of the statute for human rights litigation, including these 
corporate suits, inherently involves policy decisions that are better made 
by the executive and legislative branches, not the judicial branch . . . 
There’s a real danger that these lawsuits, if they continue to expand as 
they have, could truly interfere with relations that we have with foreign 
governments.59 
This is certainly an important issue. Over the years, several ATCA lawsuits have 
brought to the defendant stand several foreign government officials. From a constitutional 
point of view, the relationship between the United States and foreign governments is left 
to, and better served, by Congress and the President rather than federal courts. If this 
argument does not directly affect the interests of the main stakeholders of the process, i.e. 
LDC citizens, the reverse does. By adjudicating on the liability of Western companies 
and local governments, foreign courts step into foreign policy affairs, thus limiting the 
role of local governments in the shaping their foreign policy. Governments of LDCs 
generating ATCA claims are in fact not in a position of negotiating with foreign 
governments’ trade agreements and other matter of foreign policy involving trade issues 
because foreign judges eventually have the last word on the matters to be negotiated.60 
C. TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IS AN INADEQUATE CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION PROCESS 
The success of transnational claims has often been praised as a great victory for 
the victims of the violations. It is irrefutable that this form of litigation often provides 
with only avenue for redress available. Without access to foreign courts, many people 
around the world would be deprived of a chance to have their claims heard, the damages 
would not be compensated, and the violations not be prevented from happening again. 
However, is transnational litigation the best dispute resolution process available for the 
future? I am addressing this question by looking at how the capability approach addresses 
this policy challenge. After showing that the capability approach points out that 
transnational litigation is inadequate from a political standpoint, I now turn to 
transnational claims as a specific dispute resolution process. Several factors suggest it is 
an inadequate dispute resolution process in light of the capability approach’s quest for 
expansion of people’s capabilities.61 Key aspects of the adjudication process in foreign 
courts support my argument that local policymakers and international organizations and 
lawyers should direct their effort towards strengthening domestic dispute resolution 
rather than relying on transnational litigation to redress human rights violations. 
1. Participation 
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Dispute resolution scholarship points out that participation of the victims in the 
dispute resolution process should not be overlooked. Studies show that domestic litigants 
in the United Kingdom and in the United States are overall dissatisfied with the litigation 
process and that their judgments are based on their perception of the fairness of the 
procedures used in reaching decisions.62 In fact, the empirical literature shows that the 
opportunities to comprehend and actively take part in proceedings and whether they have 
control over the procedure and the outcome influence the claimants’ perception of the 
process. Under the capability approach, people shall have the capability to take part of the 
process that adjudicates their rights and freedoms. Transnational litigation offers, 
however, little possibility to meet those (procedural) needs. Both financial and practical 
constraints prevent stakeholders from directly participating in the process. Moreover, 
even if in the material conditions to attend the trial, claimants would be in the difficult 
position of understanding a process that takes place in a different language and that is that 
expression of different cultural, political and legal traditions. These reasons alone raise 
concerns of adequacy of the process, and of procedural justice of transnational litigation. 
Furthermore, the lead actors of the process are foreign lawyers, judge, and jurors, 
interpreting the process with their own Western, cultural values. 
2. Damages 
American or English courts will soon be required to make a determination of 
liability and, if liability is established, to award reasonable compensation to the victims. 
As discussed above, such determination involves important issues of what standards of 
liability foreign judges should apply.  They will likely apply standards that are commonly 
shared in the communities where they live and exercise their professions.63 Similarly, 
once the court finds the defendants liable, it will assess compensation by awarding the 
damages that are generally awarded in similar circumstances in the jurisdiction where the 
trial takes places. Courts could not act differently. As a consequence, the liquidated 
damages will be much higher than those that the claimants could recover by litigating the 
same claims in their national court. 
This conclusion creates practical and theoretical problems. From a practical 
standpoint, this system provides incentives for forum shopping and race to Western 
jurisdictions generating concerns of efficiency of the dispute resolution arrangement and 
of allocation of resources. From a theoretical standpoint, the awards raise issues of 
fairness with respect to the victims of the jurisdiction where the litigation takes place. 
They would receive relatively smaller amounts if compared to their economic losses. 
Assuming the harm inflicted is equal, LDC victims would in fact enjoy a greater 
difference between the damages awarded and the extent of the economic loss suffered 
than victims situated in similar positions and living in the jurisdiction where the litigation 
takes places.64 
3. Enforcement 
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Lastly, transnational litigation potential raises issues of enforcement of the 
judgment.  Enforcement is a process aimed at materializing the practical results of a 
judgment. In the case of damage awards, the enforcement process aims at transferring the 
amount of liquidated damages from the pockets of the liable defendant to the plaintiff. If 
enforcement of a foreign judgment is sought, the general principle of international law 
applicable in such cases is that a foreign state claims and exercises the right to examine 
judgments for four causes: (1) to determine if the court had jurisdiction; (2) to determine 
whether the defendant was properly served; (3) to determine if the proceedings were 
vitiated by fraud; and (4) to establish that the judgment is not contrary to the public 
policy of the foreign country.65 
Although enforcement has not been an issue in transnational cases so far because 
all of them in earlier stages of the litigation process or have been settled, transnational 
litigation raises issues of enforcement of the judgment. If the litigation were to take place 
in the countries where the victims reside, the final judgment would be enforced locally. 
However, the defendants’ largest assets are commonly in the United States or in the 
United Kingdom, thus creating the need for a transnational enforcement. In this scenario, 
the judgment would be deemed ‘foreign’ by U.S. and U.K. courts, thus triggering their 
right to examine the judgments. 
On the other, litigating claims in the jurisdiction where the defendant has the 
majority of its assets certainly facilitates damage awards’ enforcement. The assets of the 
liable defendant are easy to locate, and the judgment has power to be enforced without 
further scrutiny. Nonetheless, this process may raise pressing issues. First, allocating the 
money in the defendant’s pocket to foreign claimants may jeopardise the ability of 
domestic victims of tortuous acts of recovering damages awarded in their favour. Thus, 
compensating citizens of other countries for negligent actions an omissions that took 
place outside the jurisdiction and depriving domestic victims creates a tension between 
the social and the individual dimension of justice. In past few years, several large 
American and British companies have filed for bankruptcies as a result of the large 
number of personal injury lawsuits filed, mostly by domestic plaintiffs, against them.66 If 
transnational litigation targets ‘at risk of bankruptcy’ companies, damages awards in 
favour of foreign victims – although technically ‘domestic’ - would raise issues of 
fairness. In fact, if considered in its social dimension rather than the perspective of the 
individuals actors involved, scholars have pointed out that the tort system allegedly 
accomplishes goals of social justice. And those ends would be partially frustrated by 
compensating foreign victims. Although not frequent, tensions between domestic and 
foreign plaintiffs have already emerged in two U.S. bankruptcy proceedings.67 The best 
way to proceed should probably be found in favouring domestic resolution of controversy 
and in improving the system of satisfaction of transnational creditors whose monetary 
entitlements arise out of domestic judgments. Furthermore, LDC could request to secure 
the potential liability following a finding of tort liability for violations of human rights to 
foreign investors at the time of the initial investment.68 
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VI. CONCLUSION: STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW 
Infringing basic human rights is despicable, and simply morally wrong. The 
capability approach aims at giving people the necessary conditions of a life with human 
dignity. The capability approach thus provides a powerful framework to impose a moral 
duty to stop and redress those violations, and to prevent them from happening in the 
future. Shaping mechanisms to translate the ethical commands into practical actions is a 
problematic task. Legal redress seems to be, at least in Western commentators’ and 
lawyers’ mind, the mechanism that best serves these moral ends. 
In the last few years, individuals of countries that do not afford basic human rights 
have increasingly sought redress by filing transnational human rights claims. Because of 
the lack the rule of law and legal institutions that can reasonably provide redress to those 
claims, individuals whose basic rights are compressed pursue their claims where such 
preconditions exist. In the paper, I argued that, although transnational claims benefit LDC 
victims in the present time – because their harms would otherwise not be redressed – 
overtime they create unintended consequences in terms of weakening the economic and 
institutional development process of LDC and by providing an inadequate dispute 
resolution process. 
Transnational litigation should thus not be seen as the optimal mechanism of 
redress of human rights violations in LDC in the future. By contrary, local redress would 
better serve the moral goals that the capabilities approach proposes. Building stronger 
local institutions and judiciaries and a stronger rule of law in LDC is thus not only the 
best policy solution but is also a moral obligation of the parties involved in the process 
whether from the North or the South. In this regards, both stakeholders – local and 
international NGOs and foreign investors – and international organization – the UN and 
the World Bank above all69 – should be fully engaged in investing in institution and 
capability building in order to create the precondition for local redress of basic human 
rights violations, a redress able to stop and prevent those violations from happening 
again.70 
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